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NOTES
The Indefinite Detention of Excluded Aliens: Statutory and
Constitutional Justifications and Limitations
INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1980, approximately 125,000 Cuban aliens
reached the shores of the United States in what was labeled the
"Freedom Flotilla." 1 Although these aliens were inadmissible under
United States immigration law,2 the overwhelming majority were
granted special permission to stay in the United States. 3 However,
I. H.R. REP. No. 1218, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3810, 3812, describes this mass influx of Cuban aliens:
After 10,000 Cubans sought refuge in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana in the first
week in April, the United States agreed to admit 3,500 of those in the compound. They
were to be screened first in Costa Rica, but on April 18, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro
halted flights to Costa Rica. On April 20, Castro announced that Cubans wishing to emigrate to the U.S. could do so by boarding boats at Mariel Harbor. This prompted a flotilla
of private boats from the United States to go to Mariel and transport thousands of the
Cuban Nationals back to this country each day. Threats and seizures of vessels by our
government failed to stem the flow of boats.
On May 6, President Carter declared an emergency in the State of Florida resulting
from the Cuban emigration wave, thus making the Federal Emergency Management
Agency responsible for providing reimbursements to Federal, State and local agencies for
extraordinary expenses and for coordinating the activities of government and private
agencies involved in the emergency.
Four United States military facilities were designated as processing centers for those
Cubans who lacked sponsorship pending the determination of their asylum status. A
massive resettlement effort involving public and private agencies began.
On May 14, President Carter announced his program aimed at the safe and orderly
exodus of all Cubans wishing to leave Cuba, but the Castro government did not accept
this plan. U.S. Customs officials eventualy [sic] seized about 1,000 vessels, and by midJune the flow of boats from Cuba had abated.
By the time the boatlift ended, approximately 125,000 Cubans had come to the United States.
Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 101 (4th Cir. 1982); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654
F.2d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1981).
2. Practically all of the Cubans who attempted to enter the United States in the Freedom
Flotilla lacked proper entry documents and were inadmissible on that basis alone. 8 U.S.C.
§ l 182(a)(20) (1982); see Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 239, 242 (N.D. Ga. 1981),
remanded with directions, 671 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1982). In addition, the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982), contains a long list of grounds
for excluding aliens from admission into the United States. Among these are physical and
mental defects, 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(l)-(7) (1982); criminal convictions, 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(9)
(1982); moral defects, 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(l l)-(13) (1982); economic disqualification, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (14)-(15) (1982); previous exclusion or deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l6)-(17)
(1982); attempt to enter as a stowaway, 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(l8) (1982); improper or no documents, 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(l9)-(21) (1982); evasion or avoidance of military service, 8 U.S.C.
§ I 182(a)(22) (1982); illiteracy, 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(25) (1982); subversive activities or organizations, 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(27)-(29) (1982); and Nazi war criminal activity, 8 U.S.C.
§ I !82(a)(33) (1982).
3. The aliens were allowed to remain pursuant to the Attorney General's parole power.
See 8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(5)(A) (1982); see also Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 101 (4th Cir.
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aliens who admitted to committing crimes in Cuba4 were detained
by the immigration authorities pending an exclusion hearing. 5 Those
aliens who have since been found excludable6 are required by statute
to be "immediately deported" unless the Attorney General determines that such deportation is not "practicable or proper." 7 Because
Cuba's refusal to accept these aliens renders deportation impractica1982); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1385 n.1 (10th Cir. 1981). The parole provision states in relevant part:
(A) The Attorney General may . . . in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons
deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982).
Of the 125,000 Cubans who came to the United States 122,000 had been paroled into the
country by the summer of 1981. Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, IOI n.1 (4th Cir. 1982). Of
the remainder, many of whom had been detained due to their serious criminal backgrounds,
over 800 had been approved for parole by December, 1981. 676 F.2d at 101 n.1.
4. "[The Cubans] who remain incarcerated at the U.S. penitentiary [in Atlanta) are mostly
those who admitted to having a criminal past. These prisoners range from murderers to minor
offenders to political prisoners who were jailed for anti-Castro activities." Nazario, Cubans
Jailed in U.S. Star/ A Court Fight, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1983, at 17, col. 3. Most of these aliens
were excluded from the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(9) (1982) (exclusion of aliens
who have committed crimes of moral turpitude in other countries).
5. The statute contemplates that aliens arriving at a port of entry may be temporarily removed from the vessel in which they arrived for inspection by an immigration officer and that
detention may be used if needed to carry out this purpose. 8 U.S.C. § 1223(a) (1982). 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a) (1982) describes the procedures that the immigration officer should follow in the
course of the inspection. See also 8 C.F.R. § 235.1 (1982) (pertaining to scope of examination). Detention is explicitly authorized for arriving aliens who are suspected of having physical or mental defects or disabilities. For a listing of these defects and disabilities, see 8 U.S,C,
§ 1222 (1982).
If the immigration officer determines that an alien is not "clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to land," that alien "shall be detained" pending an exclusion hearing conducted before
an immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1982). These aliens are, however, eligible for parole
pending the hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982); see notes 36-38 infra and accompanying
text.
An exclusion hearing is a quasi-judicial proceeding held before an immigration judge. 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1976). Although the proceeding is not subject to all the requirements of due
process, it must be fair and conducted in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.
Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 978 (S.D. Fla. 1982), qffd in part, revd in part and remanded
sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, rehg. granted, 114 F.2d 96 (I Ith Cir. 1983).
The judge may enter an order of exclusion, which becomes final if sustained on appeal. An
alien ordered excluded following a hearing may seek review of that decision before the Board
oflmmigrationAppeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b)(l982);seealso 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(b)(1)(1982). If this
appeal is unsuccessful and a final order of exclusion is entered against the alien, further review
may be had by filing a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b)
(1982).
6. This Note will use the terms "excludable," "excluded," and "inadmissible" to refer to
aliens subject to exclusion proceedings. Unless otherwise indicated, excluded aliens are those
who are subject to immediate deportation because a final order of exclusion has been entered
against them. See 8 C.F.R. § 237.2 (1982); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l) (1982); 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.6 (1982); note 7 infra.
7. Any alien ..• arriving in the United States who is excluded under this chapter, shall
be immediately deported, in accommodations of the same class in which he arrived, unless the Attorney General, in an individual case, in his discretion, concludes that immediate deportation is not practicable or proper.
8 U.S.C. § 1127(a)(l) (1982). If the country from which the alien departed is adjacent to the
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ble, 8 a significant number of Cubans remain in detention. 9
The continued imprisonment of these excluded Cuban aliens
raises statutory and constitutional questions regarding the power of
the federal government to detain aliens that it chooses not to admit.
The answers to these questions are important not only for the Cuban
aliens presently detained but also for future American policy toward
the problem of mass illegal immigration. 10
United States and the alien is not a native or national thereof, the alien will be deported to the
country from which he originally embarked. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l) (1982).
Before 1981, the INA required that an excluded alien be deported to "the country whence
he came." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (1982). In 1981, Congress amended the law to provide a series of
alternative destination points in case an excluded alien's native country refuses his return. See
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (1982).
8. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1384, 1385-86 (10th Cir. 1981)
(noting that Cuba has refused at least six times to reaccept Cuban nationals denied admittance
to the United States). More recently, Thomas Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that "there is no good evidence
to support [the) conjecture" that Cuba might accept the return of Cubans detained in the
United States. Nazario, Cubans Jailed in U.S. Start a Court Fight, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1983, at
17, col. 3.
9. For example, about 1,100 of the Cubans who came to the United States in the Freedom
Flotilla remain in custody at the federal penitentiary in Atlanta. Approximately 950 of these
were classified as dangerous; the rest are to be released on parole as soon as sponsors become
available. Nazario, Cubans Jailed in U.S. Start a Court Fight, Wall St. J. Jan. 21, 1983, at 17,
col. 3.
These detainees are apparently those who remain in detention following the district court's
order in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 239 (N.D. Ga. 1981), remanded with directions,
671 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1982). Fernandez-Roque involved a class action on behalf of 1,800
Cuban aliens, each of whom had been detained at the Atlanta penitentiary for at least 15
months. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 539 F. Supp. 925, 929 (N.D. Ga. 1982). The court ordered their release on parole unless the government could show that a particular alien was a
threat to national security or the public interest, or that the alien was likely to abscond. 9 I
F.R.D. at 243.
10. The United States is by far the world's largest recipient of refugees and immigrants. In
1978, over 600,000 legal immigrants and refugees were admitted for permanent settlement in
the United States. Teitelbaum, Right versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy in the
United States, FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1980, 21, 24. In addition, most responsible estimates place
the number of illegal aliens in the United States at from four to six million as of the mid1970's, and the number has probably risen substantially since then. Id. at 25.
Moreover, the pressures for international migration can be expected to increase greatly in
the coming decades. Id. at 27. The International Labour Organization estimates that the developing world must generate between 600 and 700 million new jobs in the next 20 years just to
keep its unemployment rate from rising. Id. This number represents more jobs than currently
exist in the entire industrialized world. Id.
A more precise idea of the prospects for large-scale migration to the United States can be
gleaned by examining the rate of population growth in the developing countries that have been
the primary sources of migration to the United States. Aside from Jamaica and Cuba, these
countries can expect population growth ranging from about 30% to nearly 90% in the next 20
years. Id. Mexico alone must generate an estimated 31 to 33 million new jobs in the next 20
years to absorb its growing work force. A New and Secure System to Ver!fy that Job Applicants
are Authorized to Work in the United States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 130 (1981)
(statement of Ray Marshall, former Secretary of Labor). Moreover, massive flows of refugees
from the Caribbean Basin are likely because of economic and political pressures. See The
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982; Hearings on S. 2222 Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on
Immigration, Refugees, and the International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
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The most vexing of these questions arises because the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) 11 does not expressly authorize or limit the detention of those Cuban aliens who have not yet
been paroled 12 and who cannot be deported. 13 Courts faced with the
resulting statutory uncertainty have disagreed on whether the INA
permits the indefinite detention of undeportable excluded 14 aliens. 15
Cong., 2d Sess. 344 (1982) (statement of Sen. Walter D. Huddleston). See generally Smith,
Introduction, Symposium on U.S. Immigration Policy, 45 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 2 (1982).
These statistics indicate that the problems associated with illegal immigration, including the
legal issues surrounding detention, will persist.
11. 8 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1503 (1982).
12. The Attorney General may temporarily parole aliens pending their exclusion hearings.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(D)(5)(A) (1982); see note 3 supra. If a paroled alien is later found excludable,
an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulation limits the alien's detention when
deportation is impracticable:
If the exclusion order cannot be executed by deportation within a reasonable time, the
alien shall again be released on parole unless in the opinion of the district director the
public interest requires that the alien be continued in custody.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(2) (1982), amended, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,045 (1982) (effective July 9, 1982) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 212.5). Neither statute nor regulation requires the release of an
undeportable alien who has not been paroled by the time he or she is found excludable.
13. See 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(l) (1982); note 7 supra.
14. Unless otherwise indicated, this Note will use the term "excluded alien" to refer to
aliens who were not paroled pending their exclusion hearing and for whom deportation is
either impracticable or improper.
15. Compare Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1982) (indefinite detention
of undeportable, excluded alien is permissible), with Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654
F.2d 1382, 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1981) (undeportable, excluded alien must be released after a
reasonable period of negotiations for the return of the alien to the country of origin).
Questions about the legality of detaining inadmissible aliens have also been raised in cases
involving Haitian aliens. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982), ajfd. in par/,
revd. in part and remanded sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, rehg. granted, 114 F.2d 96
(11th Cir. 1983); Vigile v. Sava, 535 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y.), revd. sub nom. Bertrand v. Sava,
684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982). The number of known Haitian aliens who entered Southern
Florida illegally between 1972 and 1981 is about 35,000. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. at 978.
At least 2,100 Haitians have been detained for extended periods of time. See Louis v. Nelson,
544 F. Supp. at 984 (class action involving 2,100 Haitian aliens, some of whom had been
detained for over 11 months). Unlike their Cuban counterparts, Haitians have been detained
not because of prior crimes nor because deportation is impracticable or improper, see Bertrand
v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 207 n.5 (2d Cir. 1982), but because of administrative delays and the
Reagan Administration's pro-detention policy. See Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 979-82. Most of
the cases that have challenged the detention of Haitian aliens have involved aliens who are still
awaiting final determination of their claims for admission into the United States. See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d at 209 ("The threshold issue is the extent to which the courts may
review a decision . . . to deny parole to detained unadmitted aliens - that is, non-resident
aliens properly detained on arrival but not yet formally 'excluded' from the United States.");
Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 976 ("The primary question raised by this action is whether an excludable alien can be incarcerated during the pendency and possible appeal of his claim for admission to this country."). Although detention pending a determination on admission is clearly
authorized by statute, see note 5 supra, Haitian aliens may have alternative legal challenges to
their detention. For example, the legality of their detention may be called into question by the
extended delay in processing their claims for admission. q: Paulis v. Sava, 544 F. Supp. 819,
821 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Constitution places some outer limit on permissible delays in processing
entry application of Iraqi citizen). Also, the allegation that Haitian aliens have been treated
differently from other, similarly situated aliens of different nationalities in the parole process
has raised an important equal protection issue. See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.
1982); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973. Although some of the legal questions concerning the
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Part I of this Note examines the statutory authority for the indefinite detention of excluded aliens. It concludes that although the
INA does not explicitly authorize such detention, the statute's purposes and specific provisions imply that Congress intended to establish a statutory preference for the detention of excluded aliens. The
Note then argues in Part II that indefinite detention is constitutionally permissible when it is necessary to vindicate the government's
sovereign right to exclude aliens. The Note concludes, however, that
the Constitution requires the government to make a continuing good
faith effort to deport a detained, excluded alien.

l. INDEFINITE DETENTION UNDER THE INA
A.

The Statutory Preference for .Detention

Specific aspects of the INA support the conclusion that Congress
intended to establish a statutory preference for the detention of excluded aliens. 16 Congress placed limits only on the detention of
expelled aliens. An alien who enters the country by crossing the border, whether legally or illegally, is subject to expulsion proceedings
under the INA.17 If the Attorney General does not deport 18 an alien
detention of Haitians are closely related to those concerning the detention of Cubans, the
factual differences between these two situations call for separate consideration of the legal
issues involved. The fundamental difference is that the Haitians can be deported if ultimately
found inadmissible, Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d at 207 n.5, whereas the Cubans cannot be at
the present time. See note 8 supra.
16. The statute as a whole should be considered in determining legislative intent:
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general
purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection
with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is not
proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed.
2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 (4th ed. 1973) (footnotes
omitted); United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 653 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 455 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (D.D.C. 1978).
17. The INA provides two different kinds of administrative proceedings for aliens whom
the government seeks to deport: exclusion and expulsion. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357
U.S. 185, 189-90 (1958) (referring to separate administrative procedures for exclusion and expulsion). Courts have applied the different proceedings by distinguishing between those aliens
who have "entered" the country and those who have not. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263
(1905); United States v. Oscar, 496 F.2d 492, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1974). 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(l3)
(1982) defines "entry" as "any coming ofan alien into the United States, from a foreign port or
place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntary or otherwise . . . ." q: 8 U.S.C.
1225 (1982) (empowering immigration officials to inspect all aliens seeking admission); 8
U.S.C. § 1226 (1982) (establishing the procedures relating to the exclusion of aliens); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 235.1-236.8 (1982) (detailing the procedures for inspection and exclusion of aliens); 47 Fed.
Reg. 3Q,046 (1982) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (revising 8 C.F.R. 235.3 (1982)) (relating
to detention and deferred inspection). Aliens who have entered are called expellable aliens and
are subject to expulsion proceedings under the INA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 242.1-242.23 (1982). This Note will describe aliens who have been adjudged deportable at
expulsion proceedings as "expelled" aliens.
18. The INA refers to aliens subject to expulsion proceedings as "deportable" aliens. See 8
U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1982) (entitled "Supervison of deportable alien; violation by alien"). This
nomenclature is confusing because the INA also uses the term "deportation" when referring to
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expelled under these proceedings within six months of a final order
of deportation, the alien must be released from detention. 19 In contrast, the INA does not expressly limit the detention of excluded
aliens20 - those who have not entered the United States because
they were stopped at the border by immigration authorities. 21 At the
time of the INA's passage and in the years since, Congress has
doubtless been aware of cases in which an excluded alien was detained simply because he or she could not be deported. 22 If Congress
the removal of excluded aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l) (1982) (deportation of excluded
aliens); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1976) (deportation of expelled aliens). This Note will use the term
"deportation" to refer to both expelled and excluded aliens.
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1982). However, "[A]n alien sentenced to imprisonment shall not
be deported until such imprisonment has been terminated by the release of the alien from
confinement." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(h) (1982).
The six-month limit on detention begins to run on the date that the immigration judge
enters the final deportation order, or, if judicial review is had, from the date of the court's final
order. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1982). During the six-month period itself, a court may review
through habeas corpus the Attorney General's decision to detain if the Attorney General is not
acting with "reasonable dispatch" to deport the alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1982).
Even if released, the alien is subject to the supervision of the Attorney General pending
eventual deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1982). In addition, any alien who violates the release conditions set forth by the Attorney General is subject to a fine of not more than $1,000
and imprisonment for not more than one year. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1982). A willful failure or
refusal to depart is a felony, punishable by not more than ten years' imprisonment. 8 U.S.C.
§ l252(e) (1982).
20. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. Prior to an exclusion hearing, the INA
requires that an alien be detained, although he or she may be paroled in the Attorney General's discretion. See note 5 supra. This detention requirement indicates the general concern
that motivated Congress in enacting the INA - ensuring that the country be protected from
undesirable aliens. See note 31 i'!fra and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) ("harborage at Ellis Island is not an entry into the United States"); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S.
253, 263 (1905) (although physically within United States, alien treated as if stopped at border); United States v. Oscar, 496 F.2d 492, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1974) (alien who had never crossed
border free of official restraint had not entered); see also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S.
185, 187 (1958) ("[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens
who have come to our shores seeking admission ... and those who are within the United
States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.") Because the Cubans were stopped at the
border by American immigration authorities, they did not "enter" the United States within the
meaning of the INA. They are, therefore, excluded rather than expelled aliens.
22. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). The alien
in Shaughnessy had been detained upon his arrival in New York on February 9, 1950. 345
U.S. at 208. After he was permanently excluded in May of that year, efforts to deport him were
unsuccessful 345 U.S. at 208-09. Such efforts ended in June 1951. 345 U.S. at 209. Mezei
remained in detention until August 1954, when he was released through executive action. Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 n.36 (1958).
Despite single incidents like the one in Shaughnessy and the mass detention arising out of
the Freedom Flotilla, Congress has not expressly limited the period during which an undeportable, excluded alien can be detained. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. Congress'
refusal to alter its statutory formula in the face of such occurrences implies that it is satisfied
with the results produced by the INA.
The Tenth Circuit drew the opposite inference from congressional silence in RodriguezFernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). The court construed the INA's provisions to require that excluded, undeportable aliens be released following entry of a final order
of exclusion and, thereafter, the passage of a reasonable period for negotiations for deportation
of the alien. 654 F.2d at 1389-90. Noting that the INA places a six-month restriction on the
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had intended to do so, it could have expressly limited the detention
of excluded as well as expelled aliens.
Moreover, the resulting distinction .between the two classes of
aliens is consistent with sound policy and thus cannot be attributed
to a mere congressional failure to consider the issue. Expellable
aliens who have entered and resided in the United States generally
have greater ties to the community than do excludable aliens who
have been stopped at the border. 23 Consequently, expellable aliens
require the greater procedural protections that the INA provides
detention of expellable aliens and that no similar provision exists for excludable aliens, the
court emphasized that when Congress considered the INA, it was confronted with many expellable aliens who could not be deported:
Congress was painfully aware of more than 3,000 warrants of deportation made unenforceable by the refusals of the countries of origin to grant passports for these persons' .
return . . . . Despite these facts, or because of them, the Act provides for detention no
longer than six months in deportation [expulsion] cases.
654 F.2d at 1389. The court then posited that no similar problem had faced Congress with
respect to excludable aliens: "There is no evidence to suggest that prior to the instant case a
significant number of excludable aliens have been physically detained for periods of long duration." 654 F.2d at 1389. The Rodriquez-Fernandez court implied that because Congress had
no reason to consider the problem of prolonged detention of excluded aliens, its silence on the
subject should not be interpreted as approval. The court therefore viewed a "reasonable period" limitation on detention of excludable aliens as "consistent" with the statutory treatment
given expellable aliens by Congress. 654 F.2d at 1390. See generally Note, Statutory and Constitutional Limitations on the Indefinite Detention ofExcluded Aliens, 62 B.U. L. REV. 553, 57172 n.134 (1982).
The notion that Congress did not consider the indefinite detention of excluded aliens when
it passed the INA has not gone uncontested. In Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 980 n.18
(S.D. Fla. 1982), qffd. in part, revd. in part and remanded sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d
1455, rehg. granted, 714 F.2d 96 (I Ith Cir. 1983), the court pointed out that
[d)etention is not a new concept in the field of immigration law. During the late 1940's
and early 1950's it was a routine practice. However, in 1954, when the Ellis Island detention facility was closed, the policy was established that aliens seeking admission into the
United States should not be placed in physical incarceration unless they were a security
risk or likely to abscond.
Thus, Congress may well have considered the detention issue when the INA was passed. Its
silence in the face of such events suggests that it did not intend to limit the detention of undeportable, excluded aliens.
23. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215-16 (1953) (case
under pre-INA statute providing for parole of expellable aliens only); Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524, 537-38 (1952) (expulsion a drastic remedy after absorption into community, so right
to hearing provided); see also Note, supra note 22, at 572 n.138.
The courts, however, have granted constitutional protection to expellable aliens who entered the United States illegally and whose ties to the country may be very tenuous. See, e.g.,
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (fifth amendment, as well as fourteenth amendment,
protects aliens whose presence in the country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law); United States v. Otherson, 480
F. Supp. 1369, 1374 (S.D. Cal. 1979) (fourteenth amendment protection extending to "persons" applies to all people within jurisdiction of the United States, whether present legally or
illegally), qffd., 637 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 840 (1981); Arias v. Examining Bd. ofRefrig. & Air Conditioning Technicians, 353 F. Supp. 857, 861 (D.P.R. 1972) (due
process and equal protection of laws applies to all persons, including aliens within territorial
jurisdiction of United States); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (fourteenth
amendment provisions "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, or color, or of nationality").
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them. 24 Because Congress had a reasonable basis for distinguishing
between these two classes of aliens, courts should not attribute Congress' failure to limit the detention of excluded aliens to
forgetfulness. 25
The notion that Congress equipped the INA with a statutory
preference for detention finds additional support in the legislative
history underlying the six-month limit on the detention of expellable
aliens. Congress was concerned that the Attorney General might be
forced to release expelled aliens if he were unable to negotiate their
deportation. 26 It established the six-month limit on detention not to
encourage the release of affected aliens, but instead to provide a
more effective means of detaining them while deportation arrange24. Neither expelled nor excluded aliens may question the government's power to deport
them. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (power to expel or exclude aliens long
recognized as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments). Expellable aliens, however, are entitled to a hearing that meets the requirements
of procedural due process under the Constitution before they may be deported. See, e.g., The
Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903). On the other hand, excluded aliens,
who have not effected an entry into the country, have been held to have no consitutional right
to object to their exclusion. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215
(1953) (" 'Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned.'") (quoting United States ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 544 (1950)).
The immigration statutes and regulations also accord greater procedural rights to expellable aliens than to excludable ones. See Note, supra note 22, at 558 n.37.
25. The INA's differing treatment of expelled and excluded aliens can be explained as a
distinction that accounts for qualitative differences in the two categories. Expelled aliens, who
may have lived in the United States for some time, are more likely to have homes to return to
if they are not detained. Newly arrived, excluded aliens, however, probably have few ties to
the United States and may have no place to go if they are released. See notes 23-24supra and
accompanying text. Courts should be reluctant to disturb an explicable distinction, especially
when the statutory pattern strongly suggests a preference for a particular outcome - in this
case, detention.
26. The House committee report on the bill that first enacted the six-month provision
stated:
Existing law does not grant the Attorney General any specified period within which he
may hold deportable aliens in custody or under control while he negotiates for their return abroad. Some courts have ordered the release of such deportable aliens by means of
the writ of habeas corpus in less than 6 months, even though the delay in their deportation
was being caused by continuing negotiations between this Government and foreign governments. The Committee considers that 6 months is a reasonable time to grant to our
Government within which to conclude the necessary detail work involved in some cases
before deportation of an alien can be effected.
H.R. REP. No. 1192, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949). Senator McCarran made a similar point in
the Senate:
If the country of the deportable alien's last residence, the country of his citizenship, or the
country in which he was born refuses to accept back such deportable alien there is nothing
further that can be done under existing law and the alien is free to roam the country at
will . . . . Existing law does not grant the Attorney General any specified period within
which he may hold deportable aliens in custody or under his supervision while he negotiates for their return abroad. As a result, even though the delay in the deportation is in
many cases caused by continuing negotiation between our Government and foreign governments, the Attorney General is unable to maintain any control over aliens during this
period in which he is undertaking to effect their deportation.
96 CONG. REC. 14, 180-81 {1950).
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ments were being made. 27 Thus, this provision does not indicate the
existence of a general statutory policy of limiting detention, but
rather supports the notion that the INA was designed tofavor detention over release.
Further, if Congress had preferred release over detention, it
would have circumscribed the Executive's inherent power to detain
excluded aliens. Just two years prior to the passage of the INA, the
Supreme Court held that the Executive branch possesses inherent
power to exclude aliens. 28 In circumstances where deportation is impracticable, the power to exclude necessarily implies the power to
detain. 29 By failing to limit explicitly the detention of excluded
aliens, Congress established a statutory preference that permits the
Executive Branch to exercise its inherent power to detain them. 30
Ultimately, even though the INA does not expressly permit the
indefinite detention of undeportable, excluded aliens, the statute's
underlying purposes implicitly authorize such detention. One of
27. [A] close examination of the history of[the six-month provision relating to detention
of expellable aliens] reveals that the provision was designed to affirm rather than limit the
government's power to detain expelled aliens while deportation [is] being negotiated.
Prior to the enactment of [this provision], the lower courts had challenged the authority of
the Attorney General to detain expelled aliens beyond a brief period of time.
Note, supra note 22, 570-71 (footnotes omitted).
The lower courts have frequently challenged the Attorney General's authority to detain
expellable aliens. Note, supra note 22, at 571 n.133. One reason for the scarcity of challenges
to detention of excludable aliens may be that in the past, fewer such aliens were detained. Id.
at 571-72 n.134;see also note 22supra. Aliens generally applied for admission to the United
States before leaving their country of residence and, if denied admission, stayed in that country. See Note, supra note 22, at 571-72 n.134. This does not mean that aliens had never been
indefinitely detained before Congress passed the INA. See note 22 supra. However, because
the detention of excluded aliens had rarely been challenged, no provision was needed to assert
the government's power to detain them. Thus, the six-month provision was evidently intended to secure the government's power to detain expellable aliens rather than to insure their
release. See note 26 supra.
28. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). The Court
stated:
The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not
alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign
affairs of the nation [citations omitted]. When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implementing an inherent executive power.
338 U.S. at 542.
29. See notes 91-94 infra and accompanying text.
30. See Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982). The court in Palma posited that
although continued detention of an undeportable, excluded alien was not expressly permitted
by statute, Congress' failure to limit such detention reflects an intent to authorize restrictions
on the freedom of excluded aliens. 676 F.2d at 104. The court held that since Congress has not
expressly denied the Attorney General authority to detain undeportable, excluded aliens, the
Attorney General has implicit authority to order such detention. 676 F.2d at 104.
The court also reasoned that because Congress did not specifically provide for judicial
review of exclusion decisions, as it had for expulsion decisions,see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1982), it
probably intended to impose greater restrictions on excluded aliens than on expelled aliens.
676 F.2d at 104. Although this conclusion may be fairly inferred from the statute, one should
note that the exclusion decision is subject to judicial review by writ of habeas corpus. See 8
U.S.C. § l 105a(b) (1982).
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Congress' basic goals in passing the INA was to strengthen provisions relating to excludable aliens in order "to provide added assurance that undesirable aliens will not gain admission to the United
States."31 Any construction that requires the release of undeportable, excluded aliens would interfere with this purpose by effectively
depriving the United States of its ability to control immigration.32
Such a construction would be suspect because it would impair an
essential element of the nation's independence, its sovereign ability
to exclude potentially undesirable aliens.33 More important, courts
should avoid interpreting the INA in a manner that interferes with
the government's ability to control the admission of aliens, an interpretation that would undermine the statute's basic purposes. 34
Courts should instead defer to the congressional policy underlying
the INA by permitting the indefinite detention of undeportable, excluded aliens.35
B. The Statutory Preference for .Detention and the Attorney
General's Parole Power

The INA grants the Attorney General discretionary author;ty to
parole excluded aliens from detention for "emergent reasons" or for
31. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 1653,. 1698 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1365, U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. News].
32. In arguing that the government should have the power to order the continued detention of undeportable, excluded aliens, one commentator has noted that without the power to
detain "the country is vulnerable to the whim of foreign countries who might empty their jails
or rid themselves of unemployment by sending their undesirables to the United States." Note,
The Constitutional Rights ofExcluded Aliens: Proposed Limitations on the indefinite J)etention
ofthe Cuban Refugees, 70 GEo. L.J. 1303, 1330 (1982); see also The immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1982· Hearings on S. 2222 Before the Subcomm. on immigration and Refugee
Policy ofthe Senate Comm on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on immigration, Refugees, and
International Law ofthe House Comm on the Judiciary, 91th Cong., 2d Sess. 344 (1982) (statement of Sen. Walter D. Huddleston) (asserting that Premier Castro has identified at le ..st two
million people who might be expelled if such an action proves expedient in the future).
33. That the government of the United States •.. can exclude aliens from its territory is
a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If [the government] could not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to
the control of another power.
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889).
34. See, e.g., New York State Dept. of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973)
("We cannot interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes.").
35. This reading of congressional intent is consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 400l(a) (1976),
which was designed to restrict imprisonment of U.S. citizens to situations where statutory authorization for detention exists and to repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, Pub, L.
No. 81-831, §§ 100-116, 64 Stat. 1019 (1950). H.R. REP. No. 116, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. I, 2,
reprinted in 1971 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1435, 1435. Section 400J(a) provides: "No
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress." (emphasis added) The use of the word "citizen" implies that detention of
aliens may be permissible even if not authorized by statute. The case for such detention
should be even stronger when authority for it can be inferred from the purposes of a statute, as
is the case with the INA.
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"reasons deemed strictly in the public interest."36 This parole authority has been delegated by regulation to district directors of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 37 Release on parole
is not considered an admission into the country and affords no additional rights to an affected alien.38
In Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 39 the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that the indefinite detention of undeportable, nondangerous, inadmissible Cuban aliens was an abuse of
the Attorney General's parole discretion under the INA.40 In effect,
the court required the release of such aliens. 41
In finding an abuse of discretion, the Fernandez-Roque court betrayed a misunderstanding of the role that Congress intended parole
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d){5)(A) (1982) provides that:
The Attorney General may . . . in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily
under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed
strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but
such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the
purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served
the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled
and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any
other applicant for admission to the United States.
Strictly interpreted, the phrase "any alien applying for admission to the United States"
precludes a grant of parole to an excluded alien, because such an alien is no longer "applying
for admission." Nonetheless, the regulations of the I=igration and Naturalization Services
(INS) recognize excluded aliens as eligible for parole:
[T]he district director in charge of a port of entry may. . . efter a finding ofinadmissibility
has been made, parole into the United States temporarily in accordance with section
212(d)(5) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)] of the Act any such alien applicant for admission . . . .
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (1982), amended, 41 Fed. Reg. 30,045 (1982) (effective July 9, 1982) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 212.5) (emphasis added).
The courts have also implied that excluded aliens are eligible for parole. See Palma v.
Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982) (raised question of scope of judicial review over parole
decision involving an alien against whom an order of exclusion had been entered); RodriguezFernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (same); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91
F.R.D. 239 (N.D. Ga. 1981), remanded with directions, 611 F.2d 426 (I Ith Cir. 1982) (same);
Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (same). The issue of whether
excluded aliens should be eligible for parole has not been encountered in any case or congressional report researched.
37. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1982), amended, 41 Fed. Reg. 30,045 (1982) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. § 212.5) (effective July 9, 1982) (district director retains delegated power to parole).
38. See 8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(5)(A) (1982). The House committee report to the INA stated:
Such parole shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien, and when the purposes of
such parole shall have been served, the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to
custody from which he was paroled and shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as any other alien applying for admission.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 1106,supra note 31; cf. note 21 supra
(discussing the notion that an excluded alien is "stopped at the border").
39. 91 F.R.D. 239 (N.D. Ga. 1981), remanded with directions, 611 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1982).
40. The court found that the government abused its parole discretion by continuing to
detain a group of Cuban aliens who were excludable solely because they lacked entry documents. 91 F.R.D. at 243.
41. The court ordered the parole of each alien unless the government could show that the
alien was (I) a risk to national security, (2) likely to abscond if released, or (3) a threat to
public safety. 91 F.R.D. at 244.
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to play in the immigration process. The INA makes parole purely
discretionary by providing that the Attorney General "may" parole
· aliens into the United States.42 Thus, the Attorney General is not
required to decide in favor of parole even in the face of an "emergent" reason or a reason "in the public interest."43 This discretion,
coupled with the vast powers that Congress and the Executive exercise over immigration,44 should cause a court to refrain from finding
an abuse of discretion simply because it disagrees with the Attorney
General's decision to deny parole to a validly excluded alien. 45
The holding in Fernandez-Roque is also unsound because it fails
to take note of the INA's preference for detention. The statute does
not contemplate that parole will be used as a means to admit excluded aliens into the United States. To the contrary, the INA requires that parole
shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have
been served the alien shallforthwith return or be returned to the cust/Jdy
42. 8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(5)(A) (1982). See also 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 8:10, at 200 (2d ed. 1979) (underlying scheme ofINA was to avoid conferring legal rights on
aliens).
43. See 8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(5)(A) (1982).
44. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("This Court has repeatedly emphasized that 'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than
it is over' the admission of aliens.") (citations omitted).
In Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, rehg. granted, 714 F.2d 96 (11th Cir. 1983), the court
observed:
(I) that the authority of the political branches over immigration matters and aliens is
plenary and knows few bounds, (2) that Congress may, and has chosen to, delegate wide
discretionary authority to the Executive to administer immigration matters, and (3) that
the Executive's authority is limited by the statutory grant of Congress.
See also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889).
45. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (Where the Executive exercises
discretionary authority in the field of immigration "on the basis of a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason, the courts will [not] look behind the exercise of that discretion.").
In the case of an alien who has been found excludable, a "facially legitimate and bona fide
reason" for the denial of parole lies in the finding of excludability. An alien who has been
excluded has failed to meet the requirements for entry provided for in the INA. Consequently,
it would be a perverse result to say that the Attorney General cannot deny parole to such an
alien, or must seek a reason to deny parole in addition to the fact of excludability itself. To do
so would effectively provide a right of entry for some excluded aliens that the INA intended to
deny them.
Moreover, the fact that exclusion was based on a "technical" reason such as lack of proper
entry documents should not affect this conclusion. The Supreme Court stated in Fiallo v. Bell:
'The conditions of entry for every alien, the particular classes of aliens that shall be denied
entry altogether, the basis for determining such classification, the right to terminate hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which such determination shall be based, have been recognized as matters solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power
of this Court to control.'
430 U.S. 787, 797 (1977) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596-97 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Given this, in reviewing the Attorney General's decision to
deny parole, it is improper to distinguish among aliens based on the grounds for their exclusion as the Fernandez-Roque court did. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
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from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be
dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.46

Because the statute contemplates a return to custody upon the Attorney General's order, it effectively indicates that Congress intended to
favor detention over release. This interpretation is consistent with
the INS' treatment of the parole provision.47 Similarly, courts should
honor congressional intent by rejecting attempts to release undeportable, excluded aliens under the INA's parole provisions.
The extraordinary nature of the parole provision also implies
that it should not be used to require the release of excluded aliens.
Congress originally intended the parole power to be used only in
unusual circumstances - for example, to enable an alien to seek
medical care or to testify in a judicial proceeding.48 But its use soon
expanded, so that by 1958 the Supreme Court described parole as
46. 8 U.S.C. § l 182(d)(5)(A) (1982) (emphasis added).
47. An INS regulation that limits the detention of excluded aliens who were paroled pending their exclusion hearings, see note 12 supra, does not support an inference that the agency
interprets the INA to prohibit indefinite detention. In promulgating that regulation, the
agency addressed only the exceptional case where an alien is paroled pending his exclusion
hearing:
[T]he only exception to detention [of an alien detained at the port of arrival] is through
the exercise of parole authority under section 212(d)(5) of the Act. [8 U.S.C. l 182(d)(5)
(Supp. V 1981)].
However, in exercising this discretion [to parole aliens pending exclusion hearings], district
directors should be guided by thefact that the statutory rule is one ofdetention, and that the
use of parole authority is an exception to that rule and should be carefully and narrowly
exercised to be in conformity with the statutory purpose and legislative intent.
47 Fed. Reg. 30,044-45 (1982) (emphasis added). If the INS had intended to prohibit indefinite
detention, it would have addressed the normal case where the alien is detained pending his
exclusion hearing. The fact that the agency permits parole only for exceptional cases implies
that it does not prefer parole in typical cases.
48. The provision in the instant bill represents an acceptance of the reco=endation of
the Attorney General with reference to this form of discretionary relief. The committee
believes that the broader discretionary authority is necessary to permit the Attorney General to parole inadmissible aliens into the United States in emergency cases, such as the
case of an alien who requires i=ediate medical attention before there has been an opportunity for an i=igration officer to inspect him, and in cases where it is strictly in the
public interest to have an inadmissible alien present in the United States, such as, for
mstance, a witness or for purposes of prosecution.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1706 supra note 31. In 1965, in a
report to a bill that amended the INA, the Senate Judiciary Committee observed that the
INA's parole provisions "were designed to authorize the Attorney General to act only in emergent, individual, and isolated situations, such as the case of an alien who requires i=ediate
medical attention, and not for the immigration of classes or groups outside of the limit of the
law." S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1965). The committee stated its "express
intent" that "the parole provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which remain
unchanged by this bill, be administered in accordance with the original intention of the drafters of that legislation."
Arguably, indefinite detention is an "emergent circumstance" justifying parole under the
statute. See 8 U.S.C. § l 182(d)(5)(A). Just because such parole would be justified, however,
does not mean that the statute would require it. The parole decision still remains in the sound
discretion of the Attorney General under the statute. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying
text.
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"simply a device through which needless confinement is avoided
. . . . Physical detention of aliens is now the exception, not the rule,
and is generally employed only as to security risks or those likely to
abscond . . . ."49
Congress did not ignore this contravention of its intent but instead attempted in the Refugee Act of 198050 to limit the parole
49. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958). Although Congress intended the
Attorney General's parole power to be exercised only in extraordinary situations, see note 48
supra, and note 50 infra, presidents "have broadly interpreted this power, requesting admission into the United States for entire classes of immigrants." Note,A Comparative Overview of
the Vietnamese and Cuban Refugee Crises: .Did the Refugee Act of 1980 Clrange An;•t/ring?, 6
SUFFOLK TRANSNATL. L.J. 25, 35 (1982) (footnote omitted). Figures on the number of refugees who entered the United States on parole from 1956 through 1979 are as follows:
1956
Orphans from Eastern European countries .. . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . • • .. • .. . ..
925
1956-57
Refugees from Hungary ..•............•.............•...•.........•.•.•• 38,045
1960-65
Refugee escapees from Eastern Europe .................................... 19,754
1962
Chinese refugees from Hong Kong & Macao ............................... 14,741
1962-5/31/79
Refugees from Cuba •.....•....................................•••••••• 692,219
1973-5/31/79
Refugees from the Soviet Union .......................................... 35,758
1965-5/31/79
Indochinese refugees ........................•..............•.•••..••••• 208,200
1975-77
Chilean detainees . . . . . . • . • . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . . • . • . . . . . . . • • • • • • 1,310
1975-77
Chilean refugees from Peru . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • • • . • • . • •
112
1976-77
Latin American refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . •
343
1978-79
Lebanese refugees. . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • 1,000
1979
Cuban prisoners and families ..................•............••..••.•..•... 15,000
TOTAL ...........•................•......•....•...•.••••••••••.. 1,027,407
Average per year •...................•......•....•..........••.•••••. 44,670
S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONO, & Ao. NEWS 141,
146 (hereinafter cited as s. REP. No. 256, U.S. CODE CoNO. & Ao. NEWS].
50. Pub. L. No. %-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). The admission process for refugees differs
from that for immigrants in general. Essentially, a refugee is a person outside of his country of
nationality or residence who is unable to return due to racial, religious, or political persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § I IOI(a)(42) (1982). As such, a refugee need not meet all of the normal
immigration requirements, such as those pertaining to ability to support one's self, possession
of proper documents for admission, and literacy; the Attorney General can waive most other
requirements as well. See 8 U.S.C. § l 157(c)(3) (1982). Those meeting the refugee definition
are granted conditional entry under the asylum procedures prescribed by law. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 207.4 (1982); cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1-208.16 (1982). After a one-year
waiting period, those granted asylum who continue to be refugees, who have been physically
present in the United States, and who have not become firmly resettled in a foreign country
may apply for permanent residency in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (1982); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 209.1-209.2 (1982).
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power to its original scope.51 The Act raised the ceiling on refugee
admission from 17,400 to 50,000 annually for three years, 52 after
which the President, in consultation with Congress, was to determine
the ceiling annually. 53 The Refugee Act also outlined certain procedures under which the President was to consult with Congress when
emergency refugee situations arose. 54 Thus, the restraints embodied
in the most recent congressional attempt to deal with immigration
problems reflect an intent to prevent circumvention of the ordinary
mechanism for admission.55
51. The Senate committee report accompanying the bill that became the Refugee Act of
1980 stated:
The central feature of S. 643 is the establishment of statutory provisions for the admission
of refugees during "normal flow" periods and during emergency situations. Sections 207
through 210 of the bill also write into the Immigration and Nationality Act the role of
Congress in the admission process - ending years of ad hoc use of the parole authority,
which has been implemented by custom rather than clearly defined by law.
S. REP. No. 256 at 5, U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 145, mpra note 49;see also Note, mpra
note 49, at 35-36 (Refugee Act provision limits use of parole power to accord with intent of
original creators).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(l) (1982). The Senate committee report stated:
The 50,000 annual numbers under the bill will be obtained by reallocating to refugees
20,000 numbers from the worldwide limitation of 290,000. (17,400 of these numbers of
~ic] currently allocated to conditional entrants under section 203(a)(7), which the bill
eliminates.) In addition, 30,000 numbers will be added over and above the current worldwide limitation. As a result, total immigration subject to numerical limitation will be
320,000 annually, except in those years when refugee admissions are increased by Presidential determination, after consultation with Congress.
This number, however, does not really increase over annual immigration flow, since
by use of the parole authority over the past several decades the United States has accepted, on an average, some 40,000 refugees each year.
s. REP. No. 256 at 5, U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 145-46, mpra note 49; cf. note 49 mpra
(figures on parole admissions between 1956 and 1979).
53. See 8 U.S.C. § l 157(d) (1982). President Reagan is reco=ending the admission ofup
to 72,000 refugees for resettlement in the United States for fiscal year 1984. Consultation on

Refugee Admissions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy ofthe
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 26, 1983).
54. See 8 U.S.C. § l 157(c) (1982). The Senate Committee report described these procedures as follows:
For the first time, the bill provides procedures governing the admission of refugees in
unforeseen emergency situations. If the President determines, following consultations
with the Judiciary Committees, that an emergency refugee situation exists - that the
admission of refugees in response to such an emergency is justified by grave humanitarian
concerns or is otherwise in the national interest - he may fix a number of refugees to be
admitted. Allocation of those admissions will be in accordance with a Presidential determination, after consultation with Congress.
Thereafter, the Attorney General will admit to the United States emergency situation
refugees who establish that they meet the refugee definition and that they are not firmly
resettled in any foreign country.
S. REP. No. 256 at 10, U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 150 mpra note 49.
_
55. Because the Refugee Act amended the INA and deals with the same subject matterimmigration control - it is in pari materia with the INA. See 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 51.03 (4th ed. 1973). Thus,
[o]n the assumption that persons both in and out of legislatures would naturally tend to
think about and have their thinking influenced by other statutes on the same subject when
faced with the necessity of making a judgment about what a legislative text means, statutes in pari materia are relevant to decisions in terms of either legislative intent or meaning to others as the criterion of decision.
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Ignoring this expression of intent, the Fernandez-Roque court effectively ordered the Attorney General to exercise his discretion in
favor of parole. The court emphasized that many detained Cubans
were no different from 122,000 others who had been released on parole.56 Admittedly, when the influx of Cuban aliens in the Freedom
Flotilla took place,57 the Executive Branch ignored the emergency
procedures that Congress had established in the Refugee Act. Instead, the Executive once again turned to the parole power as a
means of permitting some 122,000 otherwise inadmissible aliens to
enter the country. 58 Congress deliberately overlooked this disregard
of the law. 59 Nevertheless, the INS was adhering to congressional
intent when it began to deny parole. Absent a discriminatory or
otherwise impermissible motive, 60 observance of the law should not
constitute an abuse of discretion. If Congress decides that parole is a
more effective way to deal with emergencies than the Refugee Act, it
can change the relevant statutes accordingly. Until Congress does
so, courts should not interfere with the INS' attempts to comply with
existing law.
The succession of legislation on parole reveals a congressional
intent to limit its use. Thus, the Fernandez-Roque court's reliance on
the parole provision to require release of undeportable, excluded
aliens improperly contravenes the congressional intent regarding the
use of parole. Unless Congress chooses to amend existing law, future courts confronted with similar situations should resolve the issue in favor of the statutory preference for detention.
Id at §51.01 (footnote omitted). The fact that Congress clearly disfavored release on parole in
the Refugee Act thus should inform a court's interpretation of the INA.
56. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 239, 242 (N.D. Ga. 1981), remanded with directions, 611 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1982) (the court released 226 aliens whose denial of parole rested
solely on lack of entry papers even though almost all of the Cuban aliens lacked such papers),
51. See note I supra and accompanying text.
58. Because the number of Cubans arriving exceeded the refugee quota, President Carter
permitted them to stay under the Attorney General's parole power. See Note, supra note 49, at
51. Approximately 122,000 of the 125,000 who came in the Freedom Flotilla had been paroled
by the summer of 1981. See note 3 supra. Because this overwhelming tide clogged the asylum
process - practically none of the Cubans were eligible for admission as regular immigrants
due to lack of entry documents - the INS created a special "Cuban/Haitian entrant" status,
see Note, supra note 49, at 51 n.148, to avoid the Refugee Act's requirement that individual
refugees prove they are in reasonable fear of persecution in their homeland. See Note, supra
note 49, at 53.
59. Congress recognized the special status of "Cuban/Haitian entrant,'' see note 58 supra,
by enacting the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-422, 94 Stat. 1799,
providing to such entrants the same benefits available under the Refugee Act. See Note, supra
note 49, at 54.
60. See Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1458,rehg. granted, 114 F.2d 96 (I Ith Cir. 1983). It
is also useful to note that, it is highly unlikely that the doctrine of estoppel could be invoked
against the government by detained aliens seeking release on parole based on the past liberal
use of parole. See generally Comment, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 19 CoLUM, L.
REV. 551 (1979).
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INDEFINITE DETENTION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitutional Permissibility of the .Detention of
Excluded Aliens

Although the statutory preference embodied in the INA implicitly authorizes the indefinite detention of excluded aliens, such incarceration must also pass constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court
has held that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it
is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." 61 This
formulation has been severely criticized by legal commentators62
and may no longer be an entirely accurate statement of the law. 63
Because recent cases suggest that aliens are entitled to some due process protection, at least in the course of determining their excludability, 64 the question that remains is the breadth of that protection. The
61. United States ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); accord Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
62. Judge Friendly has observed that a modern court probably would not approve of the
Knalfif dictum, which was cited with approval in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). See Friendly, 'Some Kind of Hearing,' 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1296-97 (1975).
Commentators have roundly criticized Mezei, which held that an excluded alien has no
due process right to a hearing on the grounds for his exclusion, even though the exclusion
resulted in the alien's indefinite detention because of the government's inability to deport him.
Professor Hart asserted that the Court's position was "patently preposterous" and an "aberration." Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1392 (1953). According to Hart, the principle that "the
Constitution always applies when a court is sitting with jurisdiction in habeas corpus," id. at
1393, forbids a court "from ever accepting as an adequate return to the writ the mere statement
that what has been done is authorized by act of Congress." Id. at 1394; see also Davis, The
Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REV. 193,279 (1956) (Mezei was flagrant
miscarriage of justice apparently motivated by monstrous idea that freedom from confinement
is merely privilege); Comment, Constitutional Law-Aliens - Exclusion ofAlien From United
States and His Detention on Ellis Island as a Security Risk Without Hearing, 34 B.U. L. REV.
85. 90 (1954) (court set dangerous precedent in Mezei, violating constitutional principle that
persons receive due process before confinement); Recent Cases, Constitutional Law-A/iensRight ofDue Process in Exclusion Proceedings, 33 NEB. L. REV. 94, 96 (1954) (Mezei reads fifth
amendment too narrowly and gives Attorney General almost dictatorial powers); 27 S. CAL. L.
REV. 315, 321 (1954) (if Mezei is based on existence of unrestricted sovereign power over
excluded aliens, it violates fundamental notions of justice and human decency).
Nothing in this Note, however, requires either an acceptance or a rejection of Mezei.
Under a strict reading of Mezei, aliens are not entitled to procedural due process protections in
challenging their exclusion. But such aliens are entitled to due process protections before they
may be "punished" in the constitutional sense. See note 23 supra. This_ Note analyzes the
alien's constitutionally protected interest in avoidingpunishment through detention, not any
presumed liberty interest in avoiding exclusion.
63. Professor Tribe has pointed out that "recent cases cast at least some doubt on any rule
so absolute," observing that the exclusion of aliens has in fact been scrutinized, albeit in a very
limited fashion. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 282 n.31 (1978); cf Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-1 l (1982) (an alien is a "person" under fifth and fourteenth amendments); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1484, rehg. granted, 714 F.2d 96 (11th Cir. 1983) ("(I]t
strains credulity to maintain that an alien within our territorial limits niay claim none of the
rights accorded our citizens."). But cf. Landon v. Plasencia, 103 S. Ct. 321, 329 (1982) (an
alien seeking admission has no constitutional rights regarding his application).
64. See note 63 supra.
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Supreme Court's current "instrumental" approach suggests that
what is due an alien is the process required to prevent unfair deprivation of an entitlement conferred upon him by law. 65 Thus, because existing statutes create an expectation that an alien will be
allowed to enter the United States if he fulfills certain criteria, 66 exclusion proceedings must conform to the requirements of due process.67 Once an alien has been excluded and is awaiting deportation,
however, his entitlement is limited, as is the scope of his due process
right. 68 Because the law does not entitle the excluded alien to release, his due process rights are not impaired when he is detained
without notice or hearing. 69
Nevertheless, the fifth amendment70 imposes substantive limits
on the government's power to detain inadmissible aliens. Excluded
aliens cannot be punished simply because they are inadmissible; the
fifth amendment requires that an alien first be convicted of a crime
in the United States.71 For those excluded aliens who have been
65. L. TRIBE, supra note 63, at 503; see, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. I, 7 (1979) (inmate seeking release); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 97 (1972) (prejudgment replevin); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972)
(dismissal of teacher). See generally Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude
Aliens, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 957 (1982).
66. See note 2 supra.
67. "[I)t would be inconsistent with any intelligible rationale underlying due process protection to deny all procedural safeguards to the new applicant where the law provides that all
individuals meeting certain objective criteria are entitled to, say, welfare." L. TRIBE, supra
note 63, at 519. Similarly, due process protection should not be denied to aliens who, if they
meet certain objective criteria, may be admitted into the United States. See Fernandez-Roque
v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1127-28 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (subjecting exclusion proceedings to due
process scrutiny); note 2 supra.
68. After he has been excluded, an undeportable alien is not "entitled" to go free. The
INA creates a preference for detention, see Part I-A supra, so it does not give rise to a legitimate expectation of freedom. Similarly, parole is a narrowly designed, discretionary authority,
see Part I-B supra; an undeportable, excluded alien cannot expect that he will be paroled.
69. See 8 U.S.C. § I 182(d)(5)(A) (1982) (providing for parole of "any alien applying for
admission" in the discretion of the Attorney General); see also 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE§ 8:10, at 200 (2d ed. 1979) (underlying scheme ofINA was to avoid conferring
legal rights on aliens). The court in Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga.
1983), reached a different result by reasoning that inadequate procedural protections in exclusion proceedings gave rise to "a legitimate expectation ... that the detention (would) end
unless some new justification for continuing the detention is established.'' 567 F. Supp. at
1128. Although the court properly criticized what it perceived to be procedural defects in the
exclusion process, see note 67 supra, it went too far when it concluded that these procedural
problems give rise to an expectation of freedom. Regardless of how the aliens were detained,
they were never entitled to go free in the United States. Thus, even if the Attorney General
does not exercise his discretion to parole aliens after they have been excluded, his discretion
cannot be reviewed on purely procedural grounds. The entitlement that such procedural protections would vindicate - the alien's expectation that he will go free if he cannot be deported
- simply does not exist. See Part I supra.
70. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall .•. be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233-38 (1896). In Wong Wing, the
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convicted of crimes in Cuba but not in the United States,72 indefinite
detention arguably violates the fifth amendment.
Whether indefinite detention runs afoul of the Constitution, however, depends on whether such detention amounts to "punishment"
in the constitutional sense. To resolve this issue, a court "must decide
whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or
whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate government
purpose." 73 The Supreme Court has indicated that this decision involves a two-pronged test: first, ''whether an alternative purpose to
which the sanction may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and [second] whether [the sanction] appears excessive in relation to
the alternative purpose assigned." 74 The first prong requires that the
restriction be designed to achieve a nonpunitive objective. The second prong has two components. To determine whether a restriction
is "excessive," a court must first inquire into the availability of less
onerous altematives;75 in the absence of such alternatives, the court
Supreme Court reviewed a statute that subjected excluded Chinese aliens to one year of hard
labor before deporting them and concluded that
the United States can, as a matter of public policy, by Congressional enactment, forbid
aliens or classes of aliens from coming within their borders . . . .
But when Congress sees fit to further promote such a policy by subjecting the persons
of such aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor . . . we think such legislation, to be
valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused.
[T]o declare unlawful residence within the country to be an infamous crime, punishable by deprivation of liberty and property, would be to pass out of the sphere of constitutional legislation, unless provision were made that the fact of guilt should first be
established by a judicial trial.
163 U.S. at 237; accord Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). In
Rodriguez-Fernandez, an undeportable excluded Cuban alien challenged his indefinite detention. Although the court decided that alien's continued detention was illegal on statutory
grounds, see note 30 supra, it gave its view on the constitutional issues involved. Specifically,
the court read Wong Wing as supporting the proposition that "an excluded alien in physical
custody within the United States may not be 'punished' without being accorded the substantive
and procedural guarantees of the Fifth Amendment." 654 F.2d at 1387.
72. American courts have traditionally refused to execute the penal judgments of foreign
countries against their own citizens. See Paust, The Unconslilulional .Deren/ion ofMexican and
Canadian Prisoners by lhe Uniled Sia/es Governmenl, 12 VAND. J. OF TRANSNATL. L. 67, 71
(1979).
73. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,
613-17 (1960); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (plurality opinion) (look to statute's
"evident purpose" in determining whether it is punitive or not); United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 324 (1946) ("The fact that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does not make
it punishment. . . . [T]here may be reasons other than punitive for such deprivation.")
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
74. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); accord Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979); see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
75. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 US.
705, 716-17 (1977) (requiring a legislature to use the least drastic means to achieve a governmental purpose that infringes a liberty interest protected by the Constitution); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 1980); cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972)
(requiring that a statute affecting constitutional rights be narrowly drawn to achieve legitimate
governmental objectives.).
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must balance the governmental interest at stake against the extent of
the restriction.76
In applying this two-pronged test to the indefinite detention of
excluded aliens, the analysis begins with the well-established propositions that deportation and detention pending deportation do not
constitute punishment.77 The reasoning underlying these propositions illustrates the way in which the Supreme Court strikes the balance between the government's sovereignty interest and the
individual's liberty interest. The method by which the Court has approached these issues supports the conclusion that indefinite detention of excluded aliens does not amount to punishment.
Under the two-pronged test, deportation itself does not amount
to punishment.78 First, it serves a legitimate nonpunitive purpose:
protection of the government's sovereign interest in controlling the
admission of aliens.79 Second, deportation is not "excessive:" it pro76. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979) (using the example of pretrial detention,
where the incursion on the detainee's liberty is outweighed by the government's interest in
ensuring the presence of the detainee at trial); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.' 374, 396
(1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499,502 (1977)
(plurality opinion) (" 'certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs
asserted to justify their abridgement.'") (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235,260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Recent [Supreme Court] decisions
indicate that substantive due process scrutiny of a government regulation involves a case-bycase balancing of the nature of the individual interest allegedly infringed, the importance of
the government interests furthered, the degree of infringement, and the sensitivity of the government entity responsible for the regulation to more carefully tailored alternative means of
achieving its goals.").
77. See notes 78 & 86 infra.
78. The courts have long held that deportation does not amount to punishment. See, e.g.,
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98 (1958) (plurality opinion) ("While deportation is undoubtedly a
harsh sanction that has a severe penal effect, this Court has in the past sustained deportation as
an exercise of the sovereign's power to determine the conditions upon which an alien may
reside in this country."); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952); Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (deportation of illegal aliens within constitutional power of
Congress); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
79. It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance
of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.
Nishimura Ek.iu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). Under the separation of powers
doctrine, this inherent power over immigration belongs to the political departments of government, and it may be exercised either through treaties or through statutes enacted by Congress.
See Nishimura Ek.iu v. United States, 142 U.S. at 659.
Modem cases agree with Nishimura Ekiu's suggestion that the government's power over
immigration is inherent rather than enumerated in the Constitution. See, e.g., Boutilier v.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524, 537 (1952); United States ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 ( 1950); see also
Gordon, The Alien and the Constitution, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. l, 21-22 (1972) (by characterizing
power over immigration as inherent, Court was enabled to bypass constitutional restraints);
Teitelbaum, Right versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy in the United States, 59 FOR·
EIGN AFF., Fall 1980, 21, 21 (control over entry by noncitizens generally considered one of the
two or three universal attributes of national sovereignty).
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tects the nation's sovereignty interest by the simple device of removing those whom the government does not wish to admit. Assuming
that deportation is less onerous than detention, 80 the only alternative
less onerous than deportation is the conditional release of illegal
aliens by parole. 81 A release requirement, however, prevents the
government from exercising its sovereign power to exclude aliens
whose presence it deems undesirable. Release also encourages illegal immigration because it allows aliens to settle, at least temporarily, in the United States. 82 To the extent that release encourages the
influx of illegal immigrants, it limits the government's future ability
to exercise its sovereign power to exclude them. 83
80. If one instead concludes that deportation is more onerous than detention, then the
constitutional permissibility of indefinite detention follows a fortiori from the permissibility of
deportation. The balancing of the governmental interest against the harshness of detention,
see notes 95-100 infra and accompanying text, would therefore be resolved in the government's favor.
81. Presumably parole could still contain some restrictions, such as reporting requirements.
See, e.g., Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 239, 241 (N.D. Ga. 1981). Moreover, parole
does not constitute admission to the United States and is revocable. 8 U.S.C. § l 182(d)(5)(A)
(1982).
82. Parole, though not a formal "admission" to the country, see note 38 supra and accompanying text, as a practical matter permits physical presence outside confinement within the
country.
83. Increased illegal immigration prevents the effective exercise of the nation's sovereign
power to exclude. The courts, a presidential task force, and the INA have all concluded that
laxity in enforcing the immigration laws reduces control over illegal immigration. The predictable consequence is an increase in the number of illegal aliens. In Haitian Refugee Center v.
Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1982), for example, the court observed that
[i]t is highly likely that INS' inaction provided the greatest inducement to the ultimate
swollen tide of incoming, undocumented Haitians. Record material suggests that a large
percentage of the aliens bought passage to the United States from promoters in Haiti
whose best sales pitch was the large number of the prospect's countrymen who, without
visas or other documents, had reached Florida and were residing there undisturbed.
Protestations by INS of the illegality of such operations could hardly be expected to prevail against the proprietary reasoning that Haitians who reached southern Florida were
living, workin!l and earning in the United States. "The proof of the pudding" was surely
seen as being m the eating; those deciding whether or not to make the trip were not dissuaded by witnessing the return of earlier emigres.
676 F.2d at 1029 n. 11; accord Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 978 n.17 (S.D. Fla. 1982),
ajfd in part, revd in part and remanded sub nom. Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, rehg. granted,
714 F.2d 96 (11th Cir. 1983); 47 Fed. Reg. 30,044 (1982) ("The appearance of an inability on
behalf of the United States Government to control unlawful immigration into this country is
'the greatest inducement to the ultimate swollen tide of undocumented aliens.'") (statement of
the INA); cf. Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 979 (presidential task force expressed concern that release
of illegal aliens would encourage even more illegal immigration).
Detention excludes an otherwise unremovable alien by preventing the alien from entering
into American society. Detention also discourages aliens from attempting to emigrate, thus
reducing the risk that the sovereign power to exclude will be overwhelmed by sheer numbers.
The INS has pointed out that "a significant number of persons who were previously deterred
from attempting to enter the United States illegally by the Service's detention policy may now
[after a court order nullifying that policy] enter the United States without fear of being detained . . . ." 47 Fed. Reg. 30,044 (1982).
One commentator has concluded that detention amounts to punishment to the extent that it
deters:
In reality, the continued detention of an alien excluded for lack of proper documentation,
who does not pose a threat to the public, can only be explained as a deterrent to other
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Because release is not a viable alternative, deportation cannot be
viewed as punishment unless the deprivation that it imposes outweighs the government's sovereign interest in excluding aliens. In
striking this balance, the Supreme Court has not ignored the harshness of deportation. 84 Nevertheless, the Court has consistently upheld deportation because the nation's sovereign power to exclude
clearly outweighs the deprivation imposed. 85 Inasmuch as deportainadmissible aliens or as retribution to an alien for burdening the country with his pres•
ence - both of which are punitive goals. . . . [I]ts use is foreclosed by the constitutional
standard.
Note, supra note 22, at 587-88 (footnotes omitted). This argument implies that deportation,
which specifically deters the alien deported, would also be unconstitutional. But see note 78
supra (indicating that deportation is constitutional). In addition, the Supreme Court has identified several factors to help courts determine whether a restriction serves to punish in the
constitutional sense:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has histori•
cally been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether
an alternative purpose to which it may ratio!}ally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant
to the inquiry, and may often point in differing directions.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (footnotes omitted). The factors
are not, however, highly predictive. The court itself admitted that the factors may cut in opposite directions and that no single factor is dispositive. 372 U.S. at 169. Thus, even if.the main
purpose of detention were deterrence - as opposed to exclusion - the existence of such a
purpose would not conclusively render detention punitive. Such a view makes one factor promotion of the traditional aims of punishment - decisive, contrary to the Court's own admonition and practice.
84. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950) ("A deportation hearing involves issues basic to human liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands
to which aliens may be returned, perhaps to life itself."); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154
(1945) ("Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship
on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of
freedom."); note 78 supra.
85. In Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896), the Supreme Court indicated
that
[n]o limits can be put by the courts upon the power of Congress to protect, by summary
methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose race or habits render them undesirable as citizens, or to expel such if they have already found their way into our land and
unlawfully remain therein.
163 U.S. at 237. In addition, the Supreme Court has "repeatedly emphasized that 'over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the
admission of aliens." Fial!:> v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citations omitted); see also
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972); IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIORA•
TION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 3.1 (1983) (the power of Congress over immigration is "vast,
perhaps limitless") (footnote omitted).
However, Congress shares this power with the executive branch. The Supreme Court
stated in United States ex rel Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950):
The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not
alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign
affairs of the nation. . . . When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implementing an
inherent executive power.
338 U.S. at 542 (citations omitted). Congress has specifically provided broad powers to the
President to exclude aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(1) (1982).
This power over immigration extends even to the exclusion or expulsion of aliens for considerations of race, politics, activities, or associations that would be constitutionally prohibited
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tion is not an excessive means of accomplishing the legitimate government objective of protecting national sovereignty, it does not
constitute punishment and is therefore constitutionally permissible.
Similarly, temporary detention pending deportation does not
amount to punishment under the Supreme Court's two-pronged
test. 86 First, such detention serves a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose. Its immediate purpose is to ensure that an alien will
be available for deportation upon the issuance of an exclusion order, 87 and, thus, its ultimate purpose is the same as that of deportation: protection of the nation's sovereignty interest by controlling
immigration. 88 Second, the Supreme Court has not regarded temporary detention as "excessive." Indeed, such a conclusion would
render the use of detention punitive and, absent conviction for a
crime in the United States, unconstitutional. 89 Apparently, the government's sovereignty interest is sufficiently compelling that it outweighs an alien's interest in going free while awaiting exclusion.
Given that deportation and detention pending deportation have
been held constitutional, indefinite detention of undeportable aliens
should also pass the Court's two-pronged test. First, indefinite detention serves the same nonpunitive governmental purpose as does
deportation: protection of the nation's sovereign interest in controlling immigration.90 Second, indefinite detention is not an "excessive"
way to protect this interest. Apart from physically forcing aliens to
with respect to citizens. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); United States ex rel Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893); J. WASSERMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE at 210-11 (3d ed. 1979); Co=ent,
The Alien and the Constitution, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 547, 549-50 (1953).
86. The courts have Jong recognized that detention pending deportation is an essential
element of the government's power to exclude or expel aliens. See Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) ("We think it clear that detention, or temporary confinement,
as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion of
aliens would be valid."). The Wong Wing court analogized such detention to pretrial detention, which ensures the availability of the accused for trial but is not considered punishment.
163 U.S. at 235 ("Detention is usual feature of every case of arrest on a criminal charge, even
when an innocent person is wrongly accused; but it is not imprisonment in a legal sense."); ef.
The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (detention pending deportation incidental
to enforcement of deportation provisions); see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228
(1896); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). See generally 2 C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE§ 8.16a (1983).
87. Detention guarantees that an alien will be available for deportation upon the issuance
of an exclusion order. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952) (detention necessarily a
part of the deportation process); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. at 235 ("Proceedings to
exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody . . . while arrangements were being made for their deportation.").
88. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
89. See text at note 74 supra.
90. See note 79 supra. One co=entator has argued that "[t]he denial of parole to an
alien who was excluded only for Jack of proper entry documents should constitute . . . a violation of the punishment without prosecution prohibition, since such an alien would not seem to
pose any threat to the public." Note, Limitations on Indefinite .Detention, supra note 22, at 588.
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leave the country even when no nation will accept them - a potentially harsh policy91 - the only other way to deal with undeportable,
excluded aliens is to release them into the United States on parole.
But mandatory release would preclude the government from exercising its sovereign power to control immigration: it would cause the
decision to admit or expel an alien to tum entirely on the willingness
of other countries to accept him.92 In addition, mandatory release
would expose the country to the consequences that another mass influx like the Cuban Freedom Flotilla might' bring. 93 In short,
This argument misperceives the primary goal of detention to be the protection of the public;
rather, detention protects the sovereign interest in controlling immigration.
91. If the United States were faced with another mass migration of illegal aliens in the
future, then the assumption made throughout this Note, that another nation can, in fact, prevent the United States from returning illegal aliens to their homeland, might be severely tested.
The President might allow these aliens to settle here under the Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 157(b)
(1982) (President may admit refugees in emergency situations where justified by "grave humanitarian concerns" or the "national interest"). However, the United States might be less
hospitable. For example, President Reagan's policy is that of interdiction at sea: "The entry of
undocumented aliens from the high seas is hereby suspended and shall be prevented by the
interdiction of certain vessels carrying such aliens." Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg.
48,107 (1981). The United States also might provide aliens with a seaworthy ship and escort
the ship back to the waters of the country from which the aliens departed. Both interdiction
and escort-back protect sovereignty through exclusion.
Moreover, either of these alternatives would probably be less expensive than detention.
The annual cost of detaining Cuban aliens at the federal penitentiary in Atlanta is estimated at
$10,000 per detainee. Nazario, Cubans Jailed in U.S. Star/ A Court Fight, Wall St. J., Jan. 21,
1983, at 17, col. 3. The Department of Justice requested $58.735 million in funds for fiscal year
1983 for detention, medical services, and care for Cuban and Haitian entrants. Dept. ofJustice
Authorization for Fiscal Year 1983: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1982) (letter of Robert A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney General).
92. One commentator has argued that even indefinite detention does not protect the na•
tion's sovereignty interest:
The physical presence of an alien who cannot be deported from this country frustrates the
goals of the sovereignty doctrine, whether or not the alien remains in confinement. The
alien has successfully imposed himself upon the United States and the government must
either devote considerable resources to his detention or permit him to enter American
society.
Note, supra note 22, at 587-88 (footnotes omitted). True, the government must spend money
for the incarceration and care of aliens, an expense it would not incur if it released the aliens
into the United States. But this cost is a policy reason for favoring release, not a constitutional
one.
Moreover, the physical presence of an alien does not "frustrate" the goals of sovereignty.
The commentator has overlooked the exclusion effect of detention and the systemic consequences of mandatory release. See note 83 supra and accompanying text. If one undeportable
alien intrudes on sovereignty, the intrusion will increase in volume as more undeportables
arrive.
Another commentator has argued that "(t)he case of the alien indefinitely in detention is
analagous to that of an individual charged with a criminal offense and facing incarceration.
After detention has dragged on for months, it can no longer be considered a temporary measure necessary to effectuate deportation, but must be considered punishment . . . ." Note,
supra note 65, at 997. Again, this ignores the exclusion effect of detention where an alien
cannot be deported. Under such circumstances, detention is not incidental to deportation; it is
the only practical means by which the government can vindicate its sovereign right to exclude
aliens. The mere assertion that it is "punishment" in such instances does not withstand the
constitutional analysis presented in this Note.
93. A recent magazine article described some of the problems faced by members of the
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mandatory release would eviscerate sovereignty by effectively granting undeportable, excluded aliens a constitutional right to enter the
country. 94 Indefinite detention is therefore the only practicable
means of vindicating the nation's sovereign power to exclude aliens
as it sees fit.
Because indefinite detention is calculated to achieve a nonpunitive objective in a manner that is not excessive, the remaining step is
to balance the government's sovereignty interest against the harshness of indefinite detention. Because temporary detention pending
deportation does not violate the Constitution, 95 the relevant "harshness" is the increased deprivation resulting from the longer detention
ofundeportables. 96 The extent of this greater deprivation is minimal
Cuban Freedom Flotilla, or "Marielitos," in adjusting to life in the United States. Tifil, Working Hard Against an Image, TIME, Sept. 12, 1983, at 24, col. l. Although the article acknowledged that "[t]he majority ofMarielitos are hard-working and peaceful," id. at 24, col. 1, it also
observed that "an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 Marielitos are violent criminals and former
mental patients." Id. This criminal element among the Marielitos now accounts for a disproportionately large number of certain crimes in various cities. The article gives the following
examples:
In Las Vegas, where there are an estimated 3,500 boat people, Marielitos account for 25%
of the cocaine trade. In New Orleans, over a ten-month period ending last April, there
were 15 Cuban homicides involving 29 Marielitos as either murderers or victims. This
criminal element tends to prey on other Cubans; its tastes run to brutal crimes of random
opportunity.
Id. at 24, col. 3.
More generally, illegal immigration contributes to a variety of social problems, not all of
which are necessarily connected with whether a particular alien is "dangerous" or not. For
example, local school districts that must absorb many new arrivals may suffer serious
problems:
[T]he unplanned immigration of great numbers of students with many special needs has
placed an immense financial burden on these State and local educational agencies. Many
districts face a situation of crisis proportions. All the witnesses agreed that they simply do
not have the resources to provide the total funds required to educate the Cuban and
Haitians.
H. REP. No. 1218, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3810, 3816. The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy noted additional problems caused by illegal immigration:
One does not have to be able to quantify in detail all of the impacts of undocumented/illegal aliens in the United States to know that there are some serious adverse
effects. Some U.S. citizens and resident aliens who can least afford it are hurt by competition for jobs and housing and a reduction of wages and standards at the workplace. The
existence of a fugitive underground class is unhealthy for society as a whole and may
contribute to ethnic tensions. In addition, widespread illegality erodes confidence in the
law generally, and immigration law specifically, while being unfair to those who seek to
immigrate legally.
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY TO THE
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 1, 1981), p. 11.
94. See note 85 supra.
95. See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.
96. The constitutional infirmity of indefinite detention must lie in the duration of the restraint, not in its nature. The fact that temporary detention is permissible m.:ans that unconstitutionality cannot be inherent in detention itself. However, one commentator has taken the
opposite position, hinting that detention itself may be punitive: "The nature of detention generally creates an inference of punitive purpose. Detention in a locked security facility is a
severe restraint on liberty and traditionally has been regarded as punishment." Note, supra
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for three reasons. First, because the United States has a strong incentive to deport affected aliens at the first available opportunity, the
"indefinite" detention of those who are undeportable need not be
longer than the temporary detention of aliens awaiting an exclusion
hearing. 97 Second, affected aliens may be better off detained than
they would be under the constitutionally permissible alternative of
deportation. 98 Third, the Constitution imposes limits on the conditions of an alien's detention, 99 thus reducing the risk that such detention will take on harshly punitive characteristics. On balance, then,
the additional deprivation that indefinite detention imposes on aliens
should not outweigh the nation's extremely strong sovereignty
interest. 100

B. Constitutional Limitations on the .Detention of Excluded Aliens
Despite the fact that indefinite detention may be permissible
under certain conditions, the Constitution should require that deportation take place if "practicable and proper" 101 and impose on the
note 22, at 584. But the commentator undermines his own argument by conceding the wellestablished proposition that detention pending deportation is not punishment in the constitutional sense, id at 585-87, thereby conceding that punishment cannot inhere in detention itself.
97. Indefinite detention does not imply unending detention. First, the Constitution does
place limits on detention, requiring that the government make a good faith effort to deport the
alien while he is detained. If the government does not make this effort, it must release the
alien. See notes 100-09 i'!fra and accompanying text. Second, there is no reason to presume
that the government's efforts to deport will prove fruitless, especially when the government has
strong incentives to deport. See note 91 supra.
98. Deportation is itself a harsh sanction. See note 84 supra. Given an announced policy
of detention, the circumstances under which aliens are nevertheless likely to try to enter the
United States are those in which they face extreme economic deprivation or persecution in
their own land. For those so affected, detention may be a less onerous burden than deportation, which is clearly permitted by the Constitution.
99. See Note,supra note 22, at 592-93 (constitutional prohibition against punishment without due process imposes restrictions on the conditions of an alien's detention). The eighth
amemdment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" does not, however, apply to
indefinitely detained aliens. This provision applies only to convicted criminals. See, e.g. , Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979).
100. q: notes 86-89 supra an<,l accompanying text (detention pending deportation is constitutionally permissible). In the case of detention pending deportation, prevention of even
minimal incursion on the nation's sovereignty interest justifies detention. The incursion is minimal because it involves only individual absconders; it would not provide an inducement to
illegal immigration, as would a policy of nondetention. See note 83 supra.
When an excluded alien cannot be deported, sovereignty is oblileraled without indefinite
detention. See notes 97-99 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the constitutional permissibility of indefinite detention arguably follows a fortiori from the permissibility of detention pending deportation.
101. The "practicable or proper" standard is borrowed from the current statute dealing
with deportation of excluded aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(l) (1982). This provision of the
INA requires that an excluded alien must be deported immediately unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, determines that immediate deportation is not practicable or proper.
The practicable or proper standard is useful in analyzing the constitutional issues involved,
because it covers the two situations in which the government may not be able to deport an
excluded alien. Deportation is not "practicable," for example, where no other country is willing to accept the excluded alien. See note 8 supra. Deportation is not "proper," for instance,
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government a good faith obligation to try to deport excluded, detained aliens. Deportation provides the government with a constitutional, 102 less onerous 103 means of protecting sovereignty. Once
deportation becomes practicable and proper, detention becomes excessive and therefore unconstitutional. 104
To say that the Constitution mandates deportation when practicable and proper, though, does not ensure compliance with this requirement. The government could circumvent this standard simply
by making no effort to deport a detained alien. To ensure compliance with the Constitution, therefore, the government should be
under an obligation to make a good faith effort to deport an excluded alien. 105
If the government detains an excluded alien after his exclusion
hearing, the alien may then rely on the writ of habeas corpus to challenge his detention. 106 The writ enables the courts to review the govwhere a court has ordered a stay of deportation because an alien adjudged excluded is also
applying for asylum. See, e.g., Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1982); see
also note 50 supra.
102. See note 78 supra.
103. If deportation were more onerous than detention, the constitutional permissibility of
indefinite detention would follow a fortiori from the permissibility of deportation. See notes
75-76 supra and accompanying text.
104. See text at note 74 supra.
105. The good faith standard proposed here is analogous to that in the current statute
dealing with deportation of expellable aliens. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1982), such aliens
may be detained for six months while the Attorney General arranges their deportation. However, expellable aliens may challenge their detention if within this period "the Attorney General is not proceeding with such reasonable dispatch as may be warranted by the particular
facts and circumstances in the case." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1982). If an excluded alien cannot be
deported to his native country or the country from which he departed for the United States, see
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (1982), he can be deported to a series of alternative countries, including
ultimately "any country which is willing to accept the alien into its territory." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(D) (1982);seealso notes 7 and 17 supra. The statutory requirement that deportation to any country be attempted before indefinite detention is authorized also has a constitutional dimension, because detention would otherwise be an excessive means of protecting the
government's sovereignty. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
.
Finally, the standard proposed here is consistent with the result in Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). In Mezei, an excluded alien who had been detained
for 21 months sought relief in a habeas corpus proceeding. See 345 U.S. at 207-09. The alien
had been excluded by the Attorney General without a hearing on national security grounds.
345 U.S. at 208. By a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court overturned a lower court decision
ordering the alien's parole. The Court held that the alien, as an excludable, was to be "treated
as if stopped at the border," 345 U.S. at 215, and had no constitutional due process right to a
hearing on the grounds for his exclusion. 345 U.S. at 212. In Mezei, however, repeated, unsuccessful efforts to deport the alien involved were made, see 345 U.S. 208-09, before he was
ultimately detained for over four years. Compare 345 U.S. at 208 (detained upon arrival in
New York in February 1950), with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 n.36 (1958) (released by an
act of executive grace in August 1954). Such efforts would have been sufficient to meet the
constitutional "good faith" standard proposed in this Note, assuming the alien was validly
excluded.
106. The Constitution provides that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
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em.mental restraint on an alien's liberty. 107 Upon review by writ of
habeas corpus, the government would have to show that it was making a good faith effort to deport the detained alien. 108 Because efforts
to deport generally involve negotiations with foreign countries, the
U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2. Statutory guidelines for use of this constitutional writ are set out
in 28 u.s.c. §§ 2241-55 (1976).
The INA provides for habeas corpus proceedings as the exclusive mechanism for judicial
review: "Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any alien against whom a final
order of exclusion has been made . . . may obtain judicial review of such order by habeas
corpus proceedings and not otherwise." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) (1982).
107. The writ of habeas corpus has for centuries been regarded as the best defense of personal freedom. See, e.g., Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 95 (1868).
The court in Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982), examined the issue of
whether detained aliens were eligible for parole in a manner consistent with the good faith
standard proposed in this Note. The Palma court held that the INA's requirement that depor•
tation take place unless not "practicable or proper" mandated periodic review of the status of
detained, excluded aliens who could not be deported. 676 F.2d at 104. The court found that
the Attorney General had complied with this requirement by establishing procedures for an
administrative review of each detainee's file on at least an annual basis. 676 F.2d at 104.
The Palma court described the Attorney General's review plan as follows:
The current plan, adopted in July 1981 and twice modified, calls first for a review of the
detainee's file. If parole cannot be recommended on that basis, a panel composed of Immigration and Department of Justice officials personally interviews the detainee. The
panel must determine if the detainee should be recommended for parole, considering such
factors as his past criminal history, his record of disciplinary infractions while in custody,
and his cooperativeness in institutional work and vocational programs. Release cannot be
recommended unless the panel members agree that (1) the detainee is presently a nonviolent person, (2) he is likely to remain nonviolent, and (3) he is unlikely to commit any
criminal offense following his release. Panel recommendations are not conclusive but
must be approved by the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The plan requires subsequent review of a detainee within one year after a decision denying him parole, and it allows earlier release on the recommendation of the staff of the
institution where the alien is detained. The plan states that after all detainees have received subsequent reviews, the procedures will be reevaluated for the purpose of determining future review of the remaining detainees.
676 F.2d at 102.
Although release on parole would eliminate the indefinite detention of an undeportable,
excluded alien, parole review is not a requirement of the INA's deportation provisions. Thus,
the Palma court erred by taking the "not practicable or proper" proviso in 8 U.S,C.
§ 1227(a)(I) (1982), which deals with deportation, and holding that it was satisfied by review
procedures designed to determine eligibility for parole. The problem with the Palma court's
interpretation is that a determination that an excluded alien should be detained because he or
she is ineligible for parole does not address the question whether deportation of that alien has
become feasible in the interim.
108. This Note does not propose a comprehensive definition of good faith or an exhaustive
list of "good faith" actions. The executive branch must be accorded a great deal of latitude in
dealing with other nations. See note 109 infra. A rigid formulation of good faith would violate the Supreme Court's admonition that "[a]ny rule of constitutional law that would inhibit
the flexibility of the political branches to respond to changing world conditions should be
adopted only with the greatest caution." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 81 (1976). In a similar
vein, the Supreme Court said in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952): "However
desirable world-wide amelioration of the lot of aliens, we think it is peculiarly a subject for
international diplomacy. It should not be initiated by judicial decision . . . ." 342 U.S. at
591.
Nevertheless, in the case of the excluded Cubans, the government's current efforts should
satisfy the standard. The government is exerting pressure on Cuba to take back the detained
aliens by refusing to issue immigration visas to Cubans. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 26, 1983,
at I, col. I.
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scope of judicial review must be relatively narrow: the executive
branch must be accorded broad discretion in the conduct of foreign
affairs. 109 Nonetheless, should the government fail to make a sufficient showing, the writ should issue and the alien should be released.
Only in this way can the courts enforce the constitutional prohibition
against the use of detention as punishment.
CONCLUSION

To protect national sovereignty, Congress has broad power to
control immigration. Congress has exercised this power in the INA.
Construed in the light of its legislative history and purpose, the INA
authorizes the indefinite detention of undeportable, excluded aliens.
Such detention does not violate the fifth amendment's prohibition
against "punishment." The Constitution does, however, limit the
government's authority by imposing a good faith obligation to attempt the deportation of detained aliens.
This result is admittedly harsh. One can sympathize both with
nondangerous detained aliens who have seen similarly situated persons go free and with the courts that have faced the plight of these
detainees. Although this Note finds that existing law requires this
harsh result, it does not necessarily endorse it. It does, however, conclude that the authority to change this result lies with Congress, not
the courts.

109. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977) (judicial deference to the executive
branch required where the executive is dealing with immigration matters involving other countries); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,319 (1936); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1892).

